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SUBJECT: A COURSE OF ACTION TO REBALANCE THE ANP

REF: KABUL 01884

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The Course of Action plan outlined below is designed for implementing President Karzai's decision to re-balance the Afghan in order to address pressing security issues in the south (reftel). by members of the international community involved with building up the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) staff to plan and execute this
END SUMMARY.

2. (SBU) BACKGROUND AND SCOPE.

The need to re-balance the Police Operating Forces became clear in the of provincial assessment studies, conducted by NSA Rassoul with input security Ministries and members of the international community. It was concerns raised by several Governors, specifically the Governors of Kandahar, Helmand, and President Karzai. Once the need to rebalance the police was apparent, several Courses of Action were developed and briefed to President Karzai on April 21, 2006. He agreed that something needed to be done and selected a Course of Action which would initially use the Afghan Highway Police's equipment to increase the strength of the Uniform, Border, and Stand-rebalancing will take place in conjunction with the necessary pay and well as the activation of Police Regional Commands, to better address concerns. However, the Course of Action will not cover overall Ministry missions or manning in Kabul.

3. (SBU) MISSION STATEMENT. Assist the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan in developing and executing plans to re-balance and re-distribute its police to address urgent security concerns, establish Police Regional Commands and Staff at the national level reform programs during the remainder of CY 2006.

4. (SBU) COURSE OF ACTION DESIGN.

a. Overview. Re-balancing is designed to improve the distribution of Forces nationally, by moving them from locations and missions where they are urgently needed to areas and missions where the need is greater. Specifically, move police to the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, and from the Highway Police to the Uniform, Stand-By and Border Police, overall national and civil security should be improved. This Course of Action cannot be implemented without proper political support: it must have the weight of the President in writing to ensure that all who must plan and execute the re-balance understand the urgency of the situation. This effort will be directed by principles from the national level with Afghans, assisted by the international

However, much of the detailed execution will be completed by the new Commands, with mentorship from the Regional Police Advisory Teams (RPAT) expect to begin re-balancing efforts by May 15, 2006, and complete them by September 1, 2006. Ultimately, these re-balancing efforts will focus on developing a future Tashkil (Afghan staffing pattern) that better reflect population demands on Afghan security forces.

b. President of Afghanistan Decision Directive (PDD) Minimum Element. To place the proper emphasis behind this task, a Presidential Decision Directive from Karzai is necessary. It will focus our efforts, assist in further defining principles and provide sustaining motivation in a process that will be difficult and sometimes frustrating. Therefore, we will work to ensure addresses as a minimum the following elements: 1) the Ministry of Interior must balance to meet urgent security needs; 2) the Afghan Highway Police must be a source of personnel and resources to accomplish the re-balancing required; 3) the Ministry of Interior must implement its selected Course of Action with

c. Guiding Principles. Because execution of this plan will be a joint effort between the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the international community combined, some guiding principles must be established nationally to ensure that purpose and intent are properly and efficiently executed. Highlighted below is our list of guiding principles for the Afghan National Police in CY 2006.

i. Re-Balancing activities must be properly recorded and captured in Tashkils. One of the reasons this re-balancing effort is currently not working is because of the inadequacies of current and past Tashkils. The development of future Tashkils must include a process to match security forces and resources with law enforcement and security needs based on population and threat.

ii. The future Tashkil must be modified by better threat and population data. IAW thorough Provincial Assessments. The international community and MOI need to pick a single standard to assess threat and population to ensure multiple views on where the re-balancing of forces is to occur.

iii. All moves should be accomplished using the principle of ?closes

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assignment first. Because of the nature of Afghan society, it is counterproductive to move personnel long distances away from their homes and families to meet police manning requirements. Coupled with a lack of electronic banking, this would allow individual police to send their pay home to families, moving personnel without regard to places of origin would only result in poverty and an increase in severance from the police forces. Therefore, our emphasis is on volunteering over forced moves.

iv. This Course of Action and any other will be affected by pay and benefits over time and require those efforts take into account the re-balancing of forces.

v. All personnel should move to new assignments with assigned weapon and personal equipment. This will provide for immediate capability upon new duty assignment. The gaining police unit will record and document weapons and equipment of all arriving personnel.

vi. The MOI should identify which highway security missions previously performed by the AHP should be maintained. These missions should be identified by historical analysis, such as reviews of arrest records and reports of commercial and private vehicles by Anti-Coalition Militias. Highway segments assessed as having a high risk of attack should retain security protection performed by the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Stand-By Police or Afghan Border Police, whichever is more appropriate.

vii. All Afghan Highway Police personnel, except for a small cadre of senior leaders, must volunteer for new positions or elect to resign from the Afghan National Police altogether.

viii. To minimize the number of AHP personnel to reassign, and to prevent the mission from growing, the MOI will be pressed to halt all AHP recruitment.

ix. Adjust all Afghan National Police fielding and logistics support to support this Course of Action.

x. Develop public information programs to highlight the major fielding initiatives, inauguration of Regional Commands and significant personnel assignment actions. Start by conducting an inaugural ceremony on May 1, 2006, at the Kandahar Police Regional Training Center that covers all Regional Commands, and includes a major display of vehicles, weapons

uniforms and equipment that will be fielded immediately to the Afghan Police in Kandahar Province.

xi. ?Proper Demographic Representation? is the basic model used to f recruiting policies for this effort. It basic tenets are listed belo

1. ?Proper Demographic Representation? was emphasized as a method of conducting business by President Karzai and applies to all types of p placing special emphasis on operational effectiveness achieved by establishing a presence and understanding with the community in which the police operate.

2. ?Proper Demographic Representation? consists of three major components: a) maintaining ethnic balance in all police units, promo and assignments - for the Afghan Uniform Police this must be done at district level and must be a goal of the current plan, and for Afghan Police and Afghan Stand-By Police this must be done at least at the regional level when feasible; b) fill police ranks, especially the lo Afghan Uniformed Police, first through local recruiting, which make i easier and should maintain proper local ethnic mix if executed fairly ensure that properly equipped police maintain a presence in the areas are responsible for and seek to achieve understanding and trust with local population.

3. Don?t over-recruit in any one particular area to fill other areas one particular ethnic group, already a often-stated concern.

4. Recruiting should use threat study and population analysis report accepted by the GOA and the international community.

d. Timeline. The initial timeline for executing this Course of Acti Further timing details will be developed by the International Communi Ministry of the Interior.

-15 May 06: RC-South established with Regional Police Advisory

-27 May 06: Commence Force Re-Balancing; Regional Command- South Ceremony with RC-South Commander and Staff, Senior MOI representative and local Afghans as well as International Press Coverage?format for events.

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-01 Jun 06: Afghan Stand-By Police Battalion deploys to RC-South per from RC-North; provides for two permanent Afghan Stand-By Police Batt in RC-South.

-15 Jun 06: Phase I Pay Reform begins for the Afghan National

-01 Jun 06: Rank Reform Phase III complete for all of the Afghan Nat Police.

-01 Aug 06: All Afghan Border Police Re-Balance actions are co

-01 Sep 06: Total Afghan National Police Re-Balance actions ar

-15 Sep 06: Institute Phase II Pay Reform for all of the Afgha

e. Fill Requirements, Priorities, and Strategies. Because each part National Police has different requirements a standard strategy or fil used. This is because in the case of the Afghan Uniform Police, the inadequately documents security requirements in RC-South. Additional Tashkil does not determine which police structures should be filled f constrained environment. Therefore the following fill strategies wil

i. Fill Strategies by Type of Police.

1. Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). Fill according to the provinces wit the highest threat and lowest ratio of police to the general populati only the four highest threat provinces and fill to a level that will these provinces online with ratios in provinces that have a low threa

a. Kandahar: current need is approximately 800 Policemen.

b. Helmand: current need is approximately 600 Policemen.

c. Uruzgan: current need is approximately 150 Policemen.

d. Paktika: current need is approximately 300 Policemen.

¶2. Afghan Stand-By Police (ASP). Because Afghan Stand-By Police are a regional asset, they should be filled by region starting with the P with the overall highest threat and lowest Police to population ratio Using that thought process listed below are the actions and fill prio for the Afghan Stand-By Police.

a. RC-South.

i. Move one Afghan Stand-By Police Battalion from RC-North (5th Bn in Konduz) permanently to RC-South and man to 100 percent: current need is approximately 140 policemen.

ii. Fill existing RC South Afghan Stand-By Police Battalion to 100 percent (2d Bn in Kandahar): current need is approximately 221 policemen..

b. Fill remaining Afghan Stand-By Police Battalions to 100 percent

i. ASP Bn in RC Central (6th Bn): current need is approximately 176 policemen

ii. ASP Bn in RC East (1st Bn): current need is approximately 372 policemen.

iii. ASP Bn in RC West: current need is approximately 100 policemen.

iv. ASP Bn in RC Central (7th Bn): current need is approximately 378 Policemen.

v. ASP Bn in RC Central (8th Bn): current need is approximately 376 policemen.

vi. ASP Bn in RC North (4th Bn in MeS): current need is approximately 343 policemen.

¶3. Afghan Border Police (ABP). Fill in accordance with the new Tash which does adequately describe Border Police requirements.

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a. RC South?4th and 5th ABP Bde?s: Current shortfall is approximately 1056 policemen.

b. RC East?2nd and 3rd ABP Bde?s: Current shortfall is approximately 848 policemen.

c. RC West?6th ABP Bde: Current shortfall is approximately 672 policemen.

d. RC Central?1st ABP Bde: Current shortfall is approximately 583 policemen.

e. RC North?7th and 8th Bde?s: Current shortfall is approximately 923 policemen.

ii. Fill (Man, Equip, Train) Priorities from 1 to n.

¶1. AUP in Kandahar.

¶2. AUP in Helmand.

¶3. 5th ASP Battalion with move to RC-South.

¶4. 2d ASP Battalion in Kandahar.

¶5. 6th ASP Battalion.

¶6. AUP in Uruzgan.

- ¶7. AUP in Paktika.
- ¶8. 4th and 5th ABP Brigades in RC-South.
- ¶9. 2nd and 3rd ABP Brigades in RC-East.
- ¶10. 1st ASP Battalion in RC-East.
- ¶11. 6th ABP Brigade in RC-West.
- ¶12. 3rd ASP Battalion in RC-West.
- ¶13. 1st ABP Brigade in RC-Central.
- ¶14. 7th ASP Battalion in RC-Central.
- ¶15. 8th ASP Battalion in RC-Central.
- ¶16. 7th and 8th ABP Brigades in RC-North.

¶17. 4th ASP Battalion in RC-North.

iii. Therefore, the total personnel requirement for all type of poli balanced is approximately 8,038.

f. Sourcing Strategies. After identifying the requirements, the sou requirements will be defined. There are four major potential sources accomplish the re-balancing tasks. All of these are limited by the i willingness to serve outside a certain radius of his ancestral homela sources we must first seek volunteers from the existing forces that w to other Police Forces with greater need and attempt to keep the volu home as possible.

i. Afghan Highway Police Manpower. The first manning pool to explor Afghan Highway Police. They are currently located in 298 fixed check locations along the Ring Road and along spur roads that lead to the 1 border crossing points. It currently has approximately 5,945 personn operating forces that could be available for placement in the Uniform and Stand-By Police. Given that not all of these personnel will elec policeman and move to a new job and location, the number available wi something less than 5,945. However, it must be clear to AHP personne must move to a new police function or lose their job.

ii. Afghan Security Force (ASF) Recruiting. There are approximately personnel along the Afghan-Pakistan Border that may still want to vol some type of national service. Some of these 800 will want to join t remainder may want to joint the ANP?presumably the Border Police firs Therefore, the Afghans must capitalize on the existing programs to de

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the ASF into our high priority requirements in RC-South, most likely Afghan Border Police Brigades.

iii. Move Personnel from Over-Manned to Under-Manned Areas. This s is the least desirable because it is least likely to be effective. M policemen will not volunteer to move long distances away from their c homes. However, the Afghan Uniformed Police is over-manned, primaril North, and the Afghans could ask for volunteers to relocate to RC-Sou Uniformed Police are under-manned, according to the threat and popula studies.

iv. Local Hire and Send to RTC for Training. The most likely source manpower after re-assigning AHP personnel is a policy of local hire. receive something near 5,900 personnel from re-balancing the Afghan H Police, then we will need to local hire approximately 2,100 new polic in several locations?primarily in RC-South. However, the Afghans mus prepared to local hire up to the entire requirement of 8,038 personne ordered to ensure re-balancing does occur.

g. Assisted Implementation Phasing. Given that re-balancing will be phasing our efforts will most likely assist in more efficient executi start in the areas of greatest need?that have the greatest security i South must be the focus of initial re-balancing efforts. The other R Police Operating Forces will be successively re-balanced on a similar In all of this the MOI will be assisted by those international commun personnel with Police expertise. Additionally, the Afghan Regional C

assisted by Regional Police Advisory Teams (RPATs), concerned with the and execution of re-balancing tasks in the regions and provinces.

i. Phase 1?starts 15 May 2006. (RC-South)

¶1. Establish all of the Regional Commands.

¶2. Begin Re-Balancing Tasks in RC-South.

¶3. Deploy one Permanent Afghan Stand-By Police Battalion to RC-South (5th ASP Bn); provides for two permanent Afghan Stand-By Police Battalions in RC-South.

¶4. Rank Reform Phase III complete.

ii. Phase 2?starts 15 June 2006. (Other RCs)

¶1. Complete Phase I Pay Reform.

¶2. Take lessons-learned from re-balancing activities in RC-South and apply to the other Regional Commands.

¶3. Afghan Border Police Reforms completed not later than 01 August 2006.

¶4. All re-balancing actions in all of the Regional Commands must be completed not later than 01 September 2006?complies with budgeting demands.

iii. Phase 3?starts 15 September 2006.

¶1. Institute Phase II Pay Reform.

¶2. Take lessons-learned from rebalancing coupled with agreed upon Threat and Population Studies and begin to develop a new Tashkil that will capture more realistic Security Forces requirements across Afghanistan.

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